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1 Two recent works reintroduce China into the anthropology of kinship. Cai Hua and
Laurent Barry are both students of Françoise Héritier, who at the Collège de France has
revitalised  our  understanding  of  the  systems  of  African  kinship.1 Their  two  books,
similarly  constructed,  devote  considerable  space  to  the  systems  of  the  Han.  The
anthropology of kinship, a discipline founded in 1870 by Lewis Henry Morgan’s Systems
of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family, and revived in 1949 by the thesis of
Claude Lévi-  Strauss,  in  Les  Structures  élémentaires  de  la  parenté  (The Elementary
Structures of Kinship), has in the course of the past 20 years absorbed the shock of new
technologies  of  reproduction  and new forms of  family  relations:  medically  assisted
procreation, cloning, blended families, civil partnerships, homosexual parentage, etc.2
The scientific positions on these burning issues have been radically opposed to each
other: on the one side are those who, following the declarations of the influential Pierre
Legendre, have asserted the immutable character of the “symbolic order” rooted in the
individual’s unconscious,3 and on the other those who, in the wake of the analyses of
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the lamented Yan Thomas, have highlighted the invented and thus malleable character
of the legal constructions of kinship.4 The works of Cai Hua and Laurent Barry present
the advantage of taking a step back from these impassioned debates and of offering us a
“view from afar” at European kinship via the detour of the Chinese systems.
2 In 1997, half a century after Lévi- Strauss’ theory first appeared, Cai Hua published his
own thesis on the Na society in China,5 which made waves – in muddied waters, some
would say – in studies of  kinship.  Under the title Une société sans père ni  mari (A
Society Without Fathers or Husbands), he describes a matrilineal society that practices
a  tradition  of  “visits”  (furtive  or  conspicuous)  by  men  that  ignores  the  rules  of
marriage.  These  rules  were  imposed  by  the  Qing  empire,  but,  as  observed  by  the
ethnologist,  the  Na  continued to  follow their  own customs.  This  observation  poses
certain ethnographic problems (how regular is the practice of the “visit” conducted?
Does it result from a situation where the men emigrate from the village?), but it also
raises an important anthropological question: is it possible to conceive of a social order
outside the framework of  marriage? Have the theories  of  kinship suffered from an
unfounded assumption of the universal nature of marriage? That would drive a wedge
into the Levi- Strauss theory of kinship, as Clifford Geertz remarked in the New York
Review of Books, providing Cai Hua’s work with great resonance: “The very idea of a
‘kinship system,’ a culture-bound notion if ever there was one, may be a large part of
the problem.”6
3 In L’homme pensé par l’homme, Cai Hua returns to the Na in order to compare them
with three other “cases.”7 The Na represent a type of kinship in which consanguinity is
transmitted by the women, the man only playing the role of a temporary “waterer” of a
fertile soil (as the Na saying goes: “if the rain does not fall from the sky, the grass will
not  grow  from  the  earth”).  In  contrast,  the  Han  case  (studied  by  Cai  Hua  during
research  in  Kunming)  understands  consanguinity  as  exclusively  masculine,  sperm
being  considered  as  blood  issued  from  the  bone.  Set  against  these  two  forms  of
monolateral  consanguinity,  Cai  Hua  puts  forward  two  other  forms,  which  he  calls
bilateral symmetrical and asymmetrical: the French accord to the man and the woman
an equal role in consanguinity (the man contributing the sperm and the woman the
blood), while among the Samo of Upper Volta studied by Françoise Héritier, the man
contributes the permanent blood and the woman a provisional blood.
4 This  tableau  of  four  cases  allows  Cai  Hua  to  define  kinship  as  the  bond  between
consanguinity (biological bond) and affinity (social bond). To reinforce this definition,
he  examines  the  different  theories  of  kinship,  from  Lewis  Henry  Morgan  to  David
Schneider, which in his eyes all exhibit the weakness of tracing kinship back either to
consanguinity (and thus the biological aspect) or to affinity (and thus the social aspect),
with  Lévi-Strauss  occupying  a  paradoxical  position  somewhere  between  these  two
poles. Cai Hua does not, however, discuss the analyses of Robertson Smith in Kinship
and Marriage in Early Arabia (1885), which linked beliefs about consanguinity to the
ritual of sacrifice as a sharing of the blood, and which exerted a major influence on the
theory of  Durkheim,  according to  which kinship is  exclusively  social,  or  ultimately
religious. From this rapid review of the history of anthropology, Cai Hua concludes that
the discipline has not been able to imagine this strange alliance of consanguinity and
affinity, or, to put it in other words, of a biological fact and a social representation, or
even, to use more charged terms, of nature and culture. He consequently proposes a
theory of belief aiming to explain that ideas emanating from the imagination can form
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institutions and act through norms (according to a tradition that he traces back to
Mencius).  This  theory  maintains  that  the  belief  in  the  transmission  of  substances
defines the individuals with whom lasting relations are established.
5 The problem that arises then is the status of the social sciences in relation to these
beliefs.  If  Cai  Hua  demonstrates  that  the  anthropological  theories  of  kinship  have
tended to reproduce a Western conception of consanguinity (from Morgan’s assertion
according to which Roman law is the most “natural” classification of the systems of
kinship,  to  Lévi-Strauss’  analysis  of  marriage  as  an  exchange  establishing  the
foundations  of  the  social  order),  what,  then,  guarantees  that  the  anthropologist’s
discourse  does  not  take  up  an  indigenous  belief  while  projecting  it  onto  other
indigenous beliefs? To answer this question, Cai Hua proposes in L’homme pensé par
l’homme an epistemology of the social sciences that does not design them on the model
of the natural sciences without renouncing their status as a science. It is not certain
that  Cai  Hua  provides  all  the  tools  to  resolve  this  epistemological  problem,  a
constituent component of these sciences since Durkheim forged the concept of “social
fact” in order to give them an object.8 The domain of “ontology” where he ends up is
promising but a  little  vague,  and the distinction between a general  ontology and a
restricted ontology remains unclear. However, the great value of his book is to pose the
problem on the basis of a very particular ethnographic case.
6 Claude Lévi-Strauss was very conscious of this problem, and all the rest of his work has
aimed at resolving it by distinguishing the environmental organisation of societies and
the  mythological  representations  that  express  their  contradictions  (according  to  a
model of “dialectical reason” borrowed from Marxism, the premises of which Cai Hua
surprisingly  does  not  discuss  here).  In  response  to  the  objection  of  the  Marxist
anthropologists, he wrote in La pensée sauvage, published in 1962: “I must now confess
to having myself unintentionally and unwittingly lent support to these erroneous ideas,
by having seemed all too often in Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté as if I were
seeking out an unconscious genesis of matrimonial exchange. I should have made more
distinction between exchange as it  is  expressed spontaneously and forcefully in the
praxis of groups and the conscious and deliberate rules by which these same groups –
or their philosophers – spend their time in codifying and controlling it.” In 1997, in
response to the objection of Cai Hua according to which the Na ignore the exchange,
Lévi-Strauss wrote in La Republica: “The Na represent an extreme case of a system,
other  examples  of  which  have  been  known  for  a  long  time,  particularly  in  Nepal,
southern India, and Africa. And far from such cases destroying the accepted ideas, the
family structure that they illustrate simply offers a symmetrical and inverse image of
our own. These are quite simply societies that do not, or no longer, place a regulatory
value on kinship and marriage in order to ensure that they function, but leave that to
other mechanisms.”9 All of Lévi-Strauss’ efforts since his Structures élémentaires de la
parenté have been invested in moving beyond this ideology of the exchange, which he
had appeared to formalise, by directing his research into the mechanisms of thought
that govern practices, the inverse effects of which can be seen in matrimonial exchange
and the Na system.
7 The book by Laurent Barry, published at the same time as that of Cai Hua, takes up this
Lévi-  Straussian  intuition  again,  but  proposes  to  synthesise  all  the  works  of
anthropology  of  kinship  that  have  appeared  since  Lévi-Strauss’s  thesis.10 The
affirmation of the founding role of exchange and communication by Lévi-Strauss in
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1949 (taking up again the analyses of Mauss on economics and of Jakobson on language)
has  indeed  been  subjected  to  at  least  two  salvos  of  objections  from  English
anthropologists.  On the  one hand,  focusing the  study of  kinship  on the  alliance  of
marriage -- defining whom it is possible to marry -- leads one to ignore the mechanisms
of  descent --  defining the members of  the group towards whom the individual  has
rights and duties.11 On the other hand, highlighting exogamy as an obligation to marry
a member of another group leads one to ignore endogamous forms of marriage, which
are  far  more  widespread  in  the  societies  of  North  Africa  (“Arab  marriage”).12
Furthermore, the Lévi- Straussian analysis of the universal character of the prohibition
of incest (at the interface between nature and culture) has been called into question by
the  research  of  ethologists  into  animal  societies,  which  similarly  understand  this
prohibition, and by the study of ancient societies that tolerated incest while giving it
various forms. Finally, the study of the complex structures of kinship, which do not
prescribe spouses but define which ones should be avoided, leads one to resort to new
tools, such as statistics and demography. From now on, the anthropology of kinship has
to be conducted, according to Laurent Barry, on new foundations, while affirming less
clearly the autonomy of a set of rules and being more attentive to the variety and the
malleability of their transformations.
8 Laurent  Barry  starts  out  from  a  minimal  definition  of  kinship:  “It  is  a  taxonomic
process that concerns the human and which sorts us into our ‘kind’ and others in the
group of individuals who are really or putatively related among themselves by birth or
marriage.  But  this  without  the  communal  identity  that  it  postulates  ever  resulting
immediately  from filiation,  consanguinity,  or  alliance.”13 He then proposes  defining
“groups of kinship” by “properties,” whereby individuals can be said to share the same
kinship,  and  by  “principles,”  which  express  the  roles  of  each  sex  in  mating  and
procreation. This leads him to distinguish four groups of kinship:14 a uterine kinship,
corresponding  roughly  to  the  forms  known  as  the  “Arab  marriage”  and  granting
women  an  overwhelming  role  in  the  generation  of  beings;  a  parallel  kinship,
corresponding to the “elementary structures” studied by Lévi-Strauss in India, Oceania,
and Africa, and obliging one to take a spouse from an outside group; a cognatic kinship,
corresponding to our system since the Republic of Rome, the transformations of which
Barry illuminates through the Christian theme of una caro (“one flesh”) uniting the
spouses; and finally, an agnatic kinship, corresponding to the Chinese system of the
Han, in which it is the man who constitutes the pivot in the bonds of kinship.
9 Laurent Barry grants a lot of space to China in his analyses. If he skips a little quickly
over the Na case (which he classifies in the field of uterine kinship),15 he does on the
other hand dedicate long analyses to the systems of kinship among the Han. There, he
reviews in detail the demonstrations of Marcel Granet in the Catégories matrimoniales
en Chine ancienne, a work that appeared in 1939 and which played a central role in the
genesis of Lévi-Strauss’s thesis.16 Barry particularly notes the attention Granet gave to
the  link  between  the  degrees  of  proximity  in  kinship  and  the  number  of  days  of
obligatory mourning. This link was expressed in the Book of Rites and then codified in
the legal texts intended for the “barbarians” who were unaware of these obligations.
The analysis of the transformation of rites into law in China is as fascinating here as the
one that precedes it on the transformation of the moral reflections of the Romans into
the theological speculations of the Christians – bearing witness to the virtues of a term-
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by-term comparison of the two traditions that does not lapse into the easy options of
Orientalism.
10 At the end of this impressive work of more than 700 pages, one question has to be
asked,  however.  Returning  in  conclusion  to  the  ambition  of  his  work,  which  is  to
“reunite in a single explanatory scheme a heteroclitic set of matrimonial systems (…)
formerly or elsewhere subject to a colourful assortment of local theories,”17 Laurent
Barry recognises that this perspective, “adopted by every science that frees itself from
its ideological foundations,” leads resolutely to “the voluntary abandonment of certain
ancient philosophical ambitions of anthropology in this domain,” such as the one that
aims  to  formulate  the  meaning  of  the  human condition  through the  passage  from
nature to culture.18 Here the epistemological reflection of Cai Hua regains its interest: is
it  possible to formulate a theory of kinship that is  entirely “freed of its  ideological
foundations”?  One  can  have  doubts  about  that  because  the  anthropologist,  if  not
writing  in  purely  formal  language,  adopts  an  entire  vocabulary  (kinship,  filiation,
alliance, consanguinity, affinity) that is laden with ideology, and above all because the
discussion that it engenders is produced by a certain historical situation and addressed
to  a  particular  community.  The  anthropology  of  kinship  raises  both  intellectual
questions and political passions, as is shown by the debates on civil partnerships in
France, because it is simultaneously ideological and critical:  ideological insofar as it
takes up some of our most common intuitions on what brings us close to other people
and what distinguishes us from them, critical insofar as it does this via the detour of
distant societies where these intuitions are disrupted. Thus the detour via Africa or
China allows Laurent Barry to  criticise  our evidence originating from the Christian
theme of  “una caro,”  just  as  the  detour  via  the  Na  allows  Cai  Hua to  criticise  the
Chinese  conception  of  marriage  in  a  way  that  he  illustrates  through  the  Chinese
proverb:  “The  stone  from  other  people’s  mountains  can  carve  our  jade.”19 This
balancing  of  ideology  and  criticism  is  what  gives  anthropology  its  philosophical
dimension. This does not mean that it expresses in systematic terms the fundamental
conditions of humanity, as some hasty readers of Structures élémentaires de la parenté
believe,  but  rather  that  its  discourse  always  lies  halfway  between the  spontaneous
philosophy  that  it  criticises  and  the  indigenous  philosophies  that  it  rehabilitates.
Claude  Lévi-  Strauss  thus  concluded  his  contribution  to  the  edition  of  L’Homme
devoted to “Questions of kinship” in 2000 with these words: “Whether one rejoices or
whether  one  frets  about  it,  philosophy  once  again  occupies  centre  stage  on  the
anthropological scene. No longer our philosophy, which my generation had asked the
exotic societies to help undo, but, in a striking reversal of things, theirs.”20
11 Translated by Nick Oates
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